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ABSTRACT 
The demand for wireless networks continues to grow as the need for portable, 
low-cost telecommunications systems increases around the world. Wireless networks are 
particularly complex because their topologies can change in response to operational 
requirements or environmental conditions and also because wireless networks are 
susceptible to electromagnetic interference. In this thesis, we consider the challenges 
associated with the operation and jamming of so-called “wireless mesh networks.” In a 
wireless mesh network, the communication devices (denoted here as a nodes) are uniform 
in their ability to send and receive transmissions. We formulate and solve two related 
optimization problems for wireless mesh networks. First, we solve the problem of the 
network operator, namely: In order to maximize the utility of delivered network traffic, 
how should one set the power transmission levels for each node, and along what 
sequence of transmission links should the traffic flow? The second problem we consider 
involves an intelligent adversary, the attacker, who wants to place jamming devices 
among a finite number of locations to disrupt the operator’s traffic in the worst possible 
way. We formulate and solve mathematical programs to obtain the optimal operation and 
jamming of these networks. We develop a computational decision-support tool that 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Wireless networks provide an effective means for information exchange in 
situations where fixed (i.e., wired) communication links are not possible or are not 
desirable. The portability of these networks allows information systems professionals the 
ability to design flexible communications networks that fit the needs of both mobile and 
stationary users without the cost or constraints of wires. As demand for these networks 
continues to grow, so do the challenges underlying their design and security.  
In this thesis, we consider the challenges associated with the operation and 
jamming of so-called “wireless mesh networks.” A wireless mesh network is a network in 
which each communication device (denoted here as a node) can serve as both a wireless 
transmitter and a wireless receiver. We assume that all nodes in the network are 
homogenous in terms of their transmission and receiving capabilities. Moreover, nodes in 
the network can serve as either the source of a communication message, the destination 
for a message, or as an intermediate transmission point. Source nodes typically 
correspond to the location of an end-user (also called a station) or the location of remote 
sensing device (also called a sensor). Destination nodes may include end-users or 
computer servers acting as data aggregation points. Nodes can play interchangeable roles, 
in the sense that the same node may be the source of one communication message, the 
destination for a different communication message, and an intermediate transmission 
point for a third message. We use the term link to refer to the bi-directional 
communication between two nodes.  
We formulate and solve two related optimization problems for wireless mesh 
networks. First, we solve the problem of the network operator, namely: In order to 
maximize the utility of delivered network traffic, how should one set the power 
transmission levels for each node, and along what sequence of transmission links should 
the traffic flow? This problem is a nonlinear convex optimization problem, and it can be 
solved by a variety of methods. The second problem we consider involves an intelligent 
adversary, the attacker, who wants to place jamming devices among a finite number of 
locations to disrupt the operator’s traffic in the worst possible way. Specifically, we 
 xvi
restrict attention to enumeration over a finite set of pre-selected jammer locations to 
obtain the most disruptive combination. In both cases, we measure network performance 
in terms of the volume of traffic delivered to source and destination nodes.   
Wireless networks play an important role in the United States (US) military. For 
example, the US Marine Corps depends heavily on wireless network technology in 
Distributed Operations (DO). The DO concept provides squad-size units the 
telecommunications technology that they need to communicate critical information with 
higher units. Wireless networks also play a considerable role in Humanitarian Assistance 
and Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. These operations usually occur in areas where 
telecommunications infrastructure is sparse (as in developing countries) or has been 
destroyed (as in the aftermath of an earthquake or hurricane), making wireless mesh 
networks increasingly important. 
We develop an interdiction model that determines the effect of jammers on the 
utility of a wireless network with optimized routing and resource allocation. We analyze 
the effects of this model on a sample network. We found that the most effective 
placement of a jammer is near source and destination nodes or critical transshipment 
nodes. Placing single jammers at other locations provides little or no effect on the 
network. We use Microsoft Excel, Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) and the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS Development Corporation, 2008) to 
implement this model in a user-friendly fashion.  
The tools developed in this thesis will provide commanders with a better 
understanding of wireless mesh network capability, vulnerability, and operation. 
Moreover, this thesis is the first step in the development of a self-contained decision 




I. INTRODUCTION  
A. WIRELESS NETWORKS  
Wireless networks provide an effective means for information exchange in 
situations where fixed (i.e., wired) communication links are not possible or are not 
desirable. The portability of these networks allows information systems professionals the 
ability to design flexible communications networks that fit the needs of both mobile and 
stationary users without the cost or constraints of wires. As demand for these networks 
continues to grow, so do the challenges underlying their design and security.  
There are many wireless communication technologies in common use today. 
These include mobile phone technologies (personal cellular phones, SMS text 
messaging), computer “wi-fi” technologies (wireless hotspots, wireless local area 
networks), technologies for satellite communication (GPS, Iridium satellite phones), and 
radar technologies for long-range sensing. In this thesis, we will focus on a particular 
network technology used in so-called “wireless mesh networks.”  
Wireless networks are increasingly popular anywhere that physical links are not 
available or possible. Examples include developing countries and rapidly changing 
environments. It is increasingly common to observe countries deploying national 
telecommunication systems built exclusively from wireless technologies (Hayden, 2006).  
Wireless networks also play a vital role in the United States (US) military. The 
need for commanders to deploy communications networks rapidly is more important than 
ever before. Military functional areas including logistics, intelligence, and warfighting all 
depend on wireless networks for critical information exchange. For example, the US 
Marine Corps depends heavily on wireless network technology in Distributed Operations 
(DO). The DO concept provides squad-size units the telecommunications technology that 
they need to communicate critical information with higher units. Members of DO units 
carry multiple wireless technologies including GPS systems, handheld radios, and various 
other event-driven sensors. These devices provide small unit leaders with the information 
that they need to make split-second decisions in crucial situations. 
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Wireless networks also play a considerable role in Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations. These operations usually occur in areas where 
telecommunications infrastructure is sparse (as in developing countries) or has been 
destroyed (as in the aftermath of an earthquake or hurricane). The success of HA/DR 
operations hinges on the ability to pass information quickly and efficiently. The 
portability of wireless networks caters to that need. 
Wireless networks are important not only for point-to-point communication but 
also for the remote sensing of environmental conditions. The ability to mass produce 
small, wireless sensing devices inexpensively means that it is now cost effective to 
deploy large quantities of “disposable” sensors that operate for only a limited period but 
are never retrieved. These “sensor nets” are increasingly employed to monitor weather, 
seismic activity, agricultural conditions, national infrastructure systems, and potential 
terrorist behavior. They can greatly enhance the situational awareness (SA) available to 
any system operator or commander. 
Wireless networks have numerous advantages over wired networks. They are easy 
to deploy because they do not require the installation of wires. This reduces the amount 
of infrastructure and manpower needed. This also allows for simple reconfiguration 
should the need arise to change network connectivity patterns. In addition, wireless 
networks do not require large, central coordination for new components to join or be 
removed from the network. Consequently, these networks provide increased flexibility 
and mobility at, arguably, a lower overall cost. 
Wireless networks also have disadvantages over wired networks. Most 
importantly, wireless networks are susceptible to electromagnetic interference. This 
interference can be caused by any number of sources, including magnets, overhead power 
lines, and even other users in the network. The interference is nonlinear in nature, so it is 
difficult to predict, detect, and mitigate. Also, the operational complexity of wireless 
networks can be higher than wired networks. For example, the range and interference 
associated with a transmitter determine the possible routes in the network as well as the 
flow transmitted over them (Johansson, 2003). This brings about challenges for efficient 
routing of data because the capacity of each link may be different and changing 
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independently over time. While software protocols exist to manage these tradeoffs, the 
parameters of these protocols may be difficult to tune, thus in practice it may be more 
difficult to optimize traffic flow in a wireless network than in a wired network. 
Because wireless transmissions are subject to interference either from the 
environment or from other signals, wireless communications are vulnerable to jamming. 
Wireless jammers are some of the oldest threats to network security. These devices aim 
to restrict or destroy a wireless communications signal between two or more nodes. 
Wireless jammers provide a nonlethal weapon to combatants at war. Both the US military 
and its foes have used them in the past. Restricting the flow of electronic information on 
a battlefield can significantly influence the outcome of an engagement. The ability to 
detect and/or employ wireless jammers can provide considerable benefits to a 
commander and affect the likelihood of mission success. 
B. RESEARCH PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In this thesis, we consider the challenges associated with the operation and 
jamming of so-called “wireless mesh networks.” A wireless mesh network is a network in 
which each communication device (denoted here as a node) can serve as both a wireless 
transmitter and a wireless receiver. We assume that all nodes in the network are uniform 
in terms of their transmission and receiving capabilities. Moreover, nodes in the network 
can serve as either the source of a communication message, the destination for a message, 
or as an intermediate transmission point. Source nodes typically correspond to the 
location of an end-user (also called a station) or the location of remote sensing device 
(also called a sensor). Destination nodes may include end-users or computer servers 
acting as data aggregation points. Nodes can play interchangeable roles, in the sense that 
the same node may be the source of one communication message, the destination for a 
different communication message, and an intermediate transmission point for a third 
message. We use the term link to refer to the bi-directional communication between two 
nodes.  
We formulate and solve two related optimization problems for wireless mesh 
networks. First, we solve the problem of the network operator, namely: In order to 
maximize the utility of delivered network traffic, how should one set the power 
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transmission levels for each node, and along what sequence of transmission links should 
the traffic flow? This problem is a nonlinear convex optimization problem, and it can be 
solved by a variety of methods. The second problem we consider involves an intelligent 
adversary (the attacker) who wants to place jamming devices (among a finite number of 
locations) to disrupt the operator’s traffic in the worst possible way. Specifically, we 
restrict attention to enumeration over a finite set of pre-selected jammer locations to 
obtain the most disruptive combination. In both cases, we measure network performance 
in terms of the utility achieved of traffic delivered to destination nodes.   
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to formulate and solve a bi-level model 
of wireless operation and jamming using optimization. In the current operational 
environment, decisions about where to place jammer locations is heuristic or ad hoc 
(Joint Doctrine for Electronic Warfare, 2000). Our objective is to provide a quantitative 
means to assess the optimal attack and defense of wireless mesh networks. Building on 
the work of Brown et al. (2006), we develop both the mathematical model and the 
computational tools needed to solve them. Specifically, we design the user interface for 
this model in Microsoft Excel, and create the solution methods in General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) (GAMS Development Corporation, 2008) and Visual Basic 
for Applications (VBA). VBA provides the user interface and establishes a connection 
between Excel and GAMS. The Mixed Integer Nonlinear Optimization Solver (MINOS) 
(Stanford Business Software, 2008) in GAMS solves the mixed integer nonlinear 
program. We analyze several numerical examples to validate the solution approach. 
These tools will provide commanders with a better understanding of wireless 
mesh network capability, vulnerability, and operation. Moreover, this thesis is the first 
step in the development of a self-contained decision support tool suitable for 
development in live exercises and real-world operations. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW OF PREVIOUS WORK 
Considerable research exists involving the optimization of wired 
telecommunications networks having fixed communication links (see Resende and 
Paradalos, 2006 and references therein). More recent research has expanded that concept 
to optimize simultaneously both the routing of flow (network layer) and allocation of 
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resources (physical layer) throughout the network. This thesis draws primarily on the 
work of Xiao et al. (2004), who present a model for optimal simultaneous routing and 
resource allocation (SRRA) in a wireless network. They use a fictional network to 
analyze the benefits of the formulation. They present a variety of design problems having 
differing (and competing) objectives, including minimum power, minimax link 
utilization, and maximum utility. Their results demonstrate that simultaneously 
optimizing routing and resources achieves a higher utility than using uniform resource 
output. 
In follow-on work, Johansson et al. (2004) develop a similar formulation and 
additionally consider optimizing transmission scheduling for wireless networks. They 
find that throughput optimization leads to activating the shortest links with nonzero flows 
and assigning zero flows to the rest of the links. This type of wireless network is not 
realistic in practice, because we expect that nodes communicate at nonzero levels. As a 
result, they modified their formulation to consider a concept of “fairness” by attempting 
to balance throughput and total utility.   
Rosati et al. (2006) document the importance of these SRRA problems. They 
argue that satellite bandwidth resources will continue to decrease as wireless technology 
progresses. Since a true SRRA model would require coordination among all nodes in a 
network, it is actually an impractical solution for extremely large networks with no 
central control (i.e., the entire Internet) (Rosati, 2006). But network managers of 
individual, decentralized networks can still benefit from the SRRA problem to optimize 
their share of a larger architecture. 
None of the existing research in SRRA problems explores network interdiction. 
Specifically, they do not consider an attacker’s goal of interdicting arc(s) that would 
cause the worst damage to the network.  
D. STRUCTURE OF THESIS AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The remainder of this thesis is arranged as follows. In Chapter II, we introduce the 
nonlinear formulation first presented by Xiao et al. (2004). We then extend this 
formulation to develop a model of wireless transmission and to consider jammer 
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interference. In Chapter III, we use this model to analyze various scenarios of jammer 
quantities and locations. In Chapter IV, we summarize the contributions of this thesis and 




II. MODEL FORMULATION 
Two nodes in a wireless network communicate through the transmission of 
electromagnetic signals. The strength and clarity of these signals are a factor of gain, 
noise, distance, and power (Xiao, 2004). Gain defines a receiving node’s ability to accept 
and interpret a signal based on its distance from the transmitter and directional 
orientation. Noise is electromagnetic interference in the signal caused by any variety of 
outside factors. Magnets, power lines, radio jammer locations, and other communication 
nodes are typical elements known to cause noise. Distance is the physical space between 
two communication nodes. Power is the strength of the signal from the transmitting 
device. A higher amount of power can overcome noise interference (Stahlberg, 2000).  
Jamming occurs when an external signal travels to a receiving antenna at the same 
frequency as a transmitter. The jammer adds noise to the receiver’s signal, causing the 
signal to lose its clarity. Noise caused by multiple jammers is additive in that the 
cumulative effect is the sum of individual interference. Enough noise can result in the 
complete loss of the signal by the receiver. Qualitatively, a successful jammer is one 
where the jamming power equals the signal power at the receiver (Stahlberg, 2000).  
The strength of a wireless signal (and its interference) is inversely proportional to 
the square of its distance. Thus, a jammer at twice the distance would have to operate at 
four times the power to achieve the same results (Stahlberg, 2000).  
A jamming attack is difficult to overcome. Unlike other security breaches, such as 
denial of service (DoS) attacks or conventional computer viruses, jammers interfere with 
architecture at the physical level (Xu, 2005). A software alteration cannot alleviate the 
effects of a jammer. Instead, the network designers must make a physical change. Nodes 
must be moved out of the path of the jammer, or flows must be rerouted through nodes 
that are not affected by the jammer. In smaller, mobile units such as light infantry 
platoons or reconnaissance teams, relocating nodes may be the most simple and 
appropriate solution. However, larger headquarters elements and command posts that are 
less mobile will find the latter solution most appropriate.  
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Many types of jammers exist. A constant jammer emits a continuous signal on 
one or more frequencies (Xu, 2005). A network’s ability to overcome this type of 
jammer’s interference depends on the number of frequencies over which it broadcasts, 
the location of the jammer, and the amount of power emitted from the jammer and from 
the transmitting nodes (Stahlberg, 2000). Other variations of jammers provide 
intermittent broadcasts of signal interference. A time interval, frequency spectrum, or set 
of reactionary events can trigger the jammer to broadcast interference. In this thesis, we 
will analyze the effects of a continuous, omni-directional jammer interfering equally on 
all frequencies. 
A. SIMULTANEOUS ROUTING AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION  
As noted previously, the SRRA model optimizes the routing and resource 
allocation (transmission power) within a wireless network. In order to formulate this 
model, we first derive and define the capacity formula of the arcs within the network. 
This formula will provide the basis for the capacity constraint in the operator’s problem.  
1. Rate-Power Capacity Curve  
We adopt the rate-power curve established by Neely et al. (2005), which is an 
extension of the Shannon Capacity formula (see also Cover and Thomas, 1991, pp. 249-
250). The rate-power curve assumes unit bandwidth for each link and considers noise 
interference by other transmitters as well as interference from outside sources such as 
wireless jammers. The capacity from transmitter i to receiver j is  
 
 log 1 (1)ij ijij
j ik ik lj lk
k j l i k
g P
n g P g P
φ
≠ ≠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= +⎜ ⎟+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑
. 
  
Here, ijP is the power assigned by node i on arc ( , )i j A∈ . The gain ijg  represents 
the receiving node’s ability to accept a signal based on its distance from the transmitting 
node. Receiving nodes j N∈  are subject to Additive White Gaussian Noises (AWGNs) 
jn . We add one to the fraction within the log function to ensure that the value of the 
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∑ ∑ corresponds to the noise caused by other transmissions to node 
j. We normally measure the power ijP and noise jn  in watts and the capacity ijφ in bits 
per second (Cover and Thomas, 1991). The gain ijg is a dimensionless constant used to 
scale the power of the transmitter. 
The gain ijg  is a function of the square of the distance between the nodes 
(Stahlberg, 2000). Following the convention in Xiao et al. (2004), we assume that 






= . The minimum length provides a factor to scale the gain in 
relation to the rest of the network. We assume that concurrent transmissions from node i 
are broadcast along different frequencies so there is no self-interference (frequency 
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2. SRRA Problem 
We consider a wireless networking problem in which the capacity of an individual 
broadcast channel (i.e., the capacity of a link in the network) follows from the power (i.e., 
the resource) assigned to it. We define data traffic on the network in terms of its 
destination, and thus we introduce a different traffic commodity for each destination. The 
challenge is to determine simultaneously the optimal capacity of each broadcast channel 
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as well as the optimal route for all network traffic. Following the problem statement by 
Xiao et al. (2004), we present mathematical program SRRA. 
The “log-utility” function imposes particular value on the traffic flowing through 
the network. For each source-destination pair, anything less than unit flow results in a 
negative contribution to system performance, with a zero flow yielding infinitely negative 
utility. Flows above the unit level yield a positive contribution to system performance 
with decreasing marginal utilities. Overall, this utility function creates incentive for fair 
and balanced flow among source-destination pairs with severe penalties for flow below 
the unit level. 
 
Formulation 1: SRRA 
 
Index Use 
i N∈   node (alias j, k) 
q Q N∈ ⊆  source node 
d D N∈ ⊆  destination node 
r R N∈ ⊆  transshipment node 
( , )i j A∈  arc (link) 
Calculated Data  
  ijd   distance between node i N∈  and j N∈  [distance] 
  m   min( ijd )     [distance] 
  iρ   total power available at node i N∈   [power] 
  jn   signal noise at node j N∈    [noise] 
Decision Variables  
d
ijX  flow along arc ( , )i j A∈  that is destined for node 
d D∈ [flow] 
d
iS   traffic supply at node i N∈  that is destined for node d D∈  
   [flow] 
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ijP  power assigned by node i to arc ( , )i j A∈    
[power] 
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The objective represents the sum of the utilities for each delivered stream of 
traffic. The first constraint (D1) enforces balance of flow at each node for each 
commodity. The second constraint (D2) ensures balance of flow between the source and 
destination nodes. The third constraint (D3) defines the capacity of arc (i,j) and follows 
directly from (3). The second term in the denominator of (3) is absent because we assume 
that wireless jammer locations are not present in this formulation. Bandwidth allocation 
for each link is fixed (i.e., each link has unit bandwidth—there is no frequency division 




allocated to it. The fourth constraint (D4) indicates that each node has a limited amount 
of power to allocate among its broadcast channels. Finally, all variables are constrained 
to be nonnegative. 
Xiao et al. (2004) solve this problem using a dual decomposition method. They 
separate the formulation into network routing and power allocation sub-problems and use 
a subgradient method with Lagrange multipliers to converge to an optimal solution. In 
this thesis, we use GAMS (GAMS Development Corporation, 2008) with the MINOS 
(Stanford Business Software, 2008) solver to obtain the solution. We guarantee an 
optimal solution because the formulation is convex. 
B. THE ATTACKER’S PROBLEM  
The previous formulation considered the task of the network operator (or 
autonomous network protocols) to assign resources to arcs and then route traffic in a 
manner that maximizes overall utility. Here we consider the challenge associated with an 
intelligent adversary who wants to disrupt this maximum flow in the worst possible 
manner. We assume that both the attacker and the defender have perfect information 
about the network, and that they share the same objective function. But the attacker 
wishes to minimize the defender’s maximum utility.  
In this problem, the attacker has a finite number of jamming devices that can be 
placed among a finite set of predetermined locations. Each jamming device interferes 
with wireless traffic by effectively increasing the “noise” seen by nearby receivers. The 
amount of interference seen by a receiver is a nonlinear function of the distance from the 
jammer placement to the receiver and the power of the jammer, all relative to the 
placement and strength of any other signals. We represent the decision problem of the 
“attacker” by introducing additional variables and constraints and presenting a 
mathematical program SRRA-Attack. 
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Formulation 2: SRRA-Attack 
 
New Index Use 
l L∈   potential jammer location 
New Data  
ljd   distance from jammer location l L∈  to receiver j N∈  
   [distance] 
New Decision Variables  
lY  binary indicator whether a jammer placed at location l L∈   
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Binary attack variables lY affect the capacity of nearby arcs via constraint (A3). A 
jammer creates noise at a receiver by broadcasting at the same frequency, as discussed in 
(4). 
C. SOLUTION APPROACH 
One approach to solving the min-max attacker’s formulation is to take the dual of 
the inner program so that the entire formulation becomes a minimization problem (Brown 
et al., 2006). Unfortunately, our formulation does not lend itself to this technique, due to 
the nonlinear nature of the objective function and capacity constraint. In addition, the use 
of linear approximations for these functions is not attractive because it either makes the 
arc transmission capacities unrealistic or makes the attack variables unrealistic for the 
underlying problem. The dual decomposition presented in Xiao et al. (2004) does not 
lend itself to this technique either.  
Given a finite number of potential jammer placements and a finite number of 
available jammer locations, it is possible to enumerate all possible attack scenarios, 
evaluate the optimal objective under each scenario, and then identify the best one(s). This 
is computationally feasible for problems of modest size, but becomes intractable for large 
problems. In the next chapters, we do exactly this. Then for larger problems, we devise 
various heuristics for quickly finding “good” combinations of jammer placements 
without having to enumerate. Our heuristic strategies include: (1) choose locations that 
afford high interference values; (2) choose jammer locations based on proximity to node 
locations; and (3) consider set covering formulations that provide interference across the 
entire region. We analyze these heuristics and compare their performance to optimal 
jammer assignments. 
D. DECISION SUPPORT TOOL 
We develop a decision support tool using GAMS and Microsoft Excel. This tool 
requires the user to input the location of nodes and jammers in the network along with 
their effective ranges. It also requires the user to input the power of the jammers and the 
nodes. The user must input the noise associated with each receiving node in the network. 
He must also designate whether a given node is a source, destination, or both.  
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We then use VBA to calculate the required data and designate the proper sets for 
the SRRA-Attack formulation. We use VBA to pass the data into GAMS. The 
formulation exists in GAMS, so we use GAMS to calculate the solution and return the 
results to Microsoft Excel. 
The use of Microsoft Excel and VBA make the tool quite simple to use. The user 
is only directly exposed to the input and the results. Minor modifications can allow a user 
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III. ANALYZING A SAMPLE NETWORK  
A. VALIDATING THE MODEL 
We begin by validating our attacker’s formulation against a network with six 
nodes and four potential jammer locations (Figure 1). The simplicity of this network will 




Figure 1.   Sample Network for Validation 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a simple mesh network with six nodes (n1, n2,...,n6) with 
maximum range equal to 0.25 placed on a square grid. By construction, n1 and n6 are 
both source and destination nodes. All links are bi-directional. For the sake of simplicity, 
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we fix the outside noise interference associated with each receiver to equal .05. We 
assume each node can emit a sum of 100 units of power. We consider five potential 
jammer locations (l1…l5). We assume the jammers to be used are uniform in their 
capabilities broadcasting on all frequencies with Power = 1 and maximum range equal to 
0.25. The maximum achievable utility for this specific network obtained as the optimal 
solution to formulation SRRA is 5.22. 
We first consider the placement of a single jammer at each of the potential 
jammer locations. We assume that the defender will reconfigure the network to operate in 
the most optimal manner after the attacker places the jammer. Table 1 shows the results 










Table 1.   Utility values for placement of a single jammer 
 
In this example, l1 and l5 are equally effective. The symmetry of the network 
lends itself to this type of solution. l2 and l4 are also equally effective. However, placing 
a jammer at l5 or l1 is more effective than placing a jammer at l2 or l4. By placing a 
jammer at l5 or l1, we force the flows in the network to travel through “jammed” nodes. 
Take l5 for example. By placing a jammer at l5, we provide additional interference to n5 
and n4. Flow traveling to and from n6 must pass through either n5 or n4. Therefore, all 
flows between n1 and n6 must travel through these “jammed” transshipment nodes. This 
reduces flow that can enter and exit n6. Balance of flow constraints force the same 
reduction of flow on n1. Since n1 and n6 are source and destination nodes, the objective 
function is reduced, hence the lower utility value. On the contrary, placing a jammer at l2 
or l4 does not create this dilemma because a free path remains between n1 and n6 that 
does not have “jammed” transshipment nodes. l3 provides an equal effect on the 
transshipment nodes since it is placed in the center of the network. 
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3.3 l1           l2           
3.3 l1           l3           
3.3 l1           l4           
3.3 l2           l5           
3.3 l3           l5           
3.3 l4           l5           
3.31 l1           l5           
3.31 l2           l4           
3.42 l2           l3           
3.42 l3           l4           
 
Table 2.   Utility values for placement of two jammers  
 
We find that several pairs of jammers produce the same effect on the network due 
to its symmetry and the balance of flow between source and destination nodes. If we 
reduce flow from n1 to n6, we must also reduce it from n6 to n1. Note that the least 
effective pairs contain at least one jammer location that is not within range of n1 or n6.    
B. ANALYSIS ON A LARGER NETWORK 
Xiao et al. (2004) presented a fictional network with 50 nodes and 170 
bidirectional links (Figure 2). Five nodes serve as both sources and destinations (n8, n10, 
n13, n25, n45). Each node is uniform and communicates with all other nodes within 0.25 
units of range. Each node has 100 units of power to allocate across all of its broadcast 
channels. Outside noise interference associated with each receiver is a random number 
generated with a uniform distribution on the interval [.01, .1]. The value of the utility 
with no jammers in the network is 17.24 and matches (within 0.1%) the solution obtained 




Figure 2.   Sample Network from Xiao et al. (2004) 
 
We next consider an intelligent adversary who wants to disrupt communication in 
this network in the worst possible way. We assume this attacker has the ability to place 
jammers at a finite number of pre-selected locations. The mathematical program, SRRA-
Attack, solves for the best combination of available jammer locations. 
In general, the attacker may or may not have control over the pre-selection of 
potential jammer sites. There are a number of factors that may affect the ability of an 
adversary to place a jammer successfully among the operator’s network. These include 




C. HEURISTICS FOR JAMMER PLACEMENT 
We consider several heuristics for the pre-selection of potential jammer locations. 
These heuristics may or may not be realistic in practice, as several factors play in the 
consideration of a potential jammer location. 
1. Node Density 
We consider four jammer locations in areas of the network where the numbers of 
arcs appear to be dense (Figure 3). The goal of the jammer placement is to reduce the 
flow between the source and destination nodes and consequently reduce the objective 
function value. We speculate that adding interference to several transshipment nodes will 




Figure 3.   Jammer locations according to node density 
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When the attacker can place a single jammer among these locations, the utility 
values in Table 3 are close in value. l1, l2, and l3 are nearer in distance to source and 
destination nodes than l4. l1 is not within an effective range of n8. However, since n8 has 
one adjacent arc, n8 reduces its flow when we affect transshipment nodes near the tail of 
the arc adjacent to n8. We use the balance of flow constraints to force the other source 
and destination nodes to reduce their flows as well. 
l2 is almost as effective as l1 and very close in distance to n10. By interfering 
with n10 and its adjacent transshipment nodes, we reduce the value of the flow from n10 








Table 3.   Utility values for placement of one jammer (node density) 
 
The utility values obtained from the placement of two jammers in Table 4 are also 
similar in value. We note that l1 and l2 appear in most of the pairs. That is not surprising 
since they are the most effective individual jammer locations. 
 
Utility Jammer Locations
14.48 l1           l2           
15 l1           l3           
15.07 l2           l3           
15.65 l1           l4           
15.75 l2           l4           
16.19 l3           l4           
 








2. Source and Destination Nodes 
We consider five jammer locations in close proximity to the five source and 
destination nodes (Figure 4). Since we base the objective function on the amount of flow 
between source and destination nodes, we speculate that jammer locations within range 
of these nodes will have considerable effects.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Jammer locations near sources and destinations 
 
We produce a larger range of utility values with these jammer locations (Table 5). 
l1 is the most effective jammer location. This is because l1 adds interference to n8 and 
most of its adjacent transshipment nodes. This significantly decreases the flow at n8 and 
consequently decreases the flow at the other source and destination nodes. l5 is the next 
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most effective jammer location. Similar to l1, l5 is within close range of n13 and its two 
adjacent transshipment nodes. By interfering with all three of these nodes, l5 reduces the 
flow at n13 and the rest of the source and destination nodes. l2, l3, and l4 are located near 
n10, n45, and n25 respectively. These source and destination nodes are different from n8 
and n13 in that they have several adjacent arcs and transshipment nodes. Many of these 
adjacent transshipment nodes are minimally affected by the jammer interference and 









Table 5.   Utility values for placement of one jammer (supply and destination) 
 
As before, the two best individual jammer locations appear in the most effective 
pair of jammer locations (Table 6). However, that logic does not follow for all scenarios. 
When we activate different jammer locations, we reroute flows and redistribute resources 
by solving a different SRRA formulation for each scenario. Therefore, an individual 
jammer location’s performance ranking may not intuitively lead to the ranking of a pair 
of jammer locations. For example, one might expect l3 and l4 to be more effective than l2 
and l4. However, the results are actually identical. 
 
Utility Jammer Locations
11.19 l1           l5           
12.79 l1           l4           
13.18 l4           l5           
13.4 l1           l3           
13.47 l1           l2           
13.86 l3           l5           
13.88 l2           l5           
15.5 l2           l4           
15.5 l3           l4           
16.06 l2           l3           
 
Table 6.   Utility values for placement of two jammers (supply and destination) 
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3. Network Cut 
We notice four locations where arcs divide the network into two distinct lower 
and upper sections. We consider four jammer locations on these arcs to produce a 
network cut and assume that this division will restrict flow between these sections 
(Figure 5). We base this assumption on the max flow-min cut concept (Leighton, 1999). 




Figure 5.   Jammer locations (network cut) 
 
We first analyze the effect of each individual jammer location on the network.  
We see a generally weak effect on the total utility (Table 7). l2 is the most  
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effective jammer location because it directly restricts the flow on n45. The effect  
of the other jammer locations is almost negligible because many other paths exist for 







Table 7.   Utility values for placement of one jammer (network cut)  
 
When we place jammers at two locations, we get similar results (Table 8). The 
effect of the jammer locations is almost insignificant. We also achieve similar effects 
from placing jammers at all four locations (Table 9). 
This strategy is mediocre because source and destination nodes can still 
communicate within their own portion of the network. The objective function rewards the 
network for flow that enters and exits the five source and destination nodes. As long as 
all source and destination nodes exchange one unit of flow between each other, there is 
no penalty for sharing the majority of flow with fewer peers. In the case where we place 
jammers at all four jammer locations, a minimal amount of flow moves between the 
lower and upper portion of the network. 
 
Utility Jammer Locations
16.4 l2           l3           
16.46 l1           l2           
16.5 l2           l4           
16.86 l1           l3           
16.91 l1           l4           
16.96 l3           l4           
 




15.66 l1 l2 l3 l4 
 
Table 9.   Utility value for placement of four jammers (network cut) 
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D. ENUMERATING ALL POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
We consider a simple grid of potential jammer locations, spaced 0.1 units apart. 
By evaluating each of these 121 possible locations, we find the most effective solutions 
and verify the conclusions gained in the previous strategies.  
1. Most and Least Effective Jammer Locations 
We evaluate all 121 potential jammer locations for the placement of one jammer 
and find the most and least effective jammer locations in the network. The results support 
our prior conclusions. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Ten most effective jammer locations 
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The most effective single jammer labeled 1 (Figure 6). This is consistent with 
earlier conclusions. n8 is almost a single point of failure because it has one adjacent arc. 
Placing a jammer near n8 or its adjacent node causes a significant decrease in utility. We 
see a similar result near n13 because it has only two adjacent arcs. We illustrate the 














Table 10.   Utility values for most effective jammer locations 
 
Like the previous scenarios, the most effective pair of jammer locations is 
comprised of the two most effective individual jammer locations. We note that the utility 
achieved by placing a jammer at both 1 and 2 is negative. We also note that the most 
effective jammer is included in all of the pairs in Table 11. These results are a natural 
extension of the nature of the log-utility objective function (Chapter II, Section A-2).  
 
Utility Jammer Locations
-1.81 1          2           
-1.46 1          3           
0.84 1          4           
1.18 1          6           
1.21 1          7           
1.40 1          8           
1.46 1 10 
 
Table 11.   Utility values for most effective pairs of jammer locations 
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The chart in Figure 7 shows a comparison of the 30 most effective placements of 
one or two jammers in the network. In the case of one jammer, we note that only the five 
best locations have an extremely significant effect on the network. The other locations are 
similarly weak in comparison. In the case of two jammers, one jammer is always located 




Figure 7.   Best operator response to different jammer placement 
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We further validate our conclusions by observing the ten least effective jammer 
locations (Figure 8).    
 
Figure 8.   Ten least effective jammer locations 
 
 
Note that location 121 does not have any effect on the network because it is not 
within effective range of any of the nodes. The other jammer locations have little effect 
for the same reasons we found previously. Most of them are far from source and 
destination nodes. Several are near transshipment nodes that are not critical to flows 
along the network. This supports our prior conclusions. 
The placement of individual jammers at locations 112-121 yields utility in range 
[17.09, 17.24]. The placement of two jammers at locations 112-121 yields utility in range 
[17.09, 17.13]. We note that the utility with no jammers in 17.24.  
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 We show the results of enumerating all 121 jammer locations within a contour 
map in Figure 9 that highlights effective jammer placement with dark areas and 
ineffective jammer placement with light areas. Such a figure can serve as a decision 
support tool for commanders to understand where to allocate security assets. 
 
Figure 9.   The effect of placing one jammer 
 
We note that the majority of the network contains regions where the placement of 
a single jammer is equally effective. As expected, placing a jammer near source and 
destination nodes is the most effective attack. However, other options are available as 
well. We can place a jammer near n11, n28, n6, or n7 and achieve effective results. In 
fact, the results can be as effective as placing a jammer near n25 or n10. We also see that 
placing a jammer near n4 or n18 is almost completely ineffective. We presume that those 
nodes have limited flow passing through them.  
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2. Secured Source and Destination Nodes 
 We find that placing jammers near source and destination nodes is the most 
effective strategy for reducing the log-utility of flows in a wireless network. However, 
this may not be a realistic approach in practical application. It is likely that commanders 
will surround source and destination nodes with considerable security. This can include a 
fixed perimeter defense in addition to roving patrols. This defensive posture may make it 
difficult to place jammers within an effective range of source and destination nodes. 
Additionally, other security obstacles may arise that prevent an attacker from placing a 
jammer in a given location.  
We consider the 30 most effective jammer locations outside a 0.25 unit radius of 
all of the source and destination nodes and denote them (C1,…C30). The results show 
that these candidate locations are near critical transshipment nodes (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10.   30 most effective jammer locations not near source and destination nodes 
33 
We take a closer look at the 15 most effective jammer locations outside a 0.25 
unit radius of all of the source and destination nodes (Figure 11). The jammer locations 
surround critical transshipment nodes near n8 and n13. This is not surprising since those 
nodes have few adjacent arcs. 
 











We evaluate the effectiveness of placing the one, two, three, or four jammers at 
the best available locations outside the perimeter of source and destination nodes (Figure 
12). We find that this strategy can be more effective than placing jammers near some of 
the source and destination nodes. For instance, placing jammers near transshipment nodes 
adjacent to n13 and n8 is more effective than placing jammers next to n10, n45, or n25.  
Note that the best combination of four jammers outside the protected perimeter has a 












We rank each of the 30 best individual jammer locations and pairs of jammer 
locations not near source and destination nodes in Figure 13. Excluding the very best 








E. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
 We find that the most effective placement of a single jammer is near a source or 
destination node. However, if that is not an option, placing a jammer near a 
transshipment node with a large amount of flow moving through it can produce similar 
results. The network cut does not produce effective results under the log-based objective 
function. Placing a jammer where the node density is high can be effective, but only if the 
jammer is near transshipment nodes that have a high amount of flow passing through 









Figure 14.   Results of the most effective jammer location sets among different 
heuristics 
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The tools developed in this thesis provide commanders with a quantitative means 
of optimizing network resource allocation and assessing the effect of jamming devices 
within a network. This will enable commanders to employ these systems more effectively 
in training and real-world operations. 
We developed an interdiction model that determines the effect of jammers on the 
utility of a wireless network with optimized routing and resource allocation. To our 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply bi-level models to this problem. We analyzed 
the effects of this model on a sample network. We found that the most effective 
placement of a jammer is near source and destination nodes or transshipment nodes that 
have a large amount of flow passing through them. Placing jammers at other locations 
provides little or no effect on the network. 
The examples in this thesis contain several assumptions that may not be realistic 
in practice. We can adjust these assumptions to reflect a given real-world scenario. For 
example, we can vary the capabilities of the nodes and jammers, rather than keeping all 
of them uniform. We can also consider directional jammers instead of the omni-
directional jammers portrayed in this thesis. We can consider various objective functions 
to reflect better the goals of the network manager.  
We have developed a decision support tool that facilitates the rapid analysis of 
other networks having various characteristics. This can include the portrayal of terrain 
and security obstacles, increased electromagnetic interference, and single points of 
failure. We can also extend the research beyond the realm of local area networks. 
Examples include satellite networks, cellular phone networks, and GPS networks.  
This thesis portrays a network that uses frequency division multiple access 
(FDMA). The work can be extended to study other types of modulation including code-
division multiple access (CDMA), time division multiple access (TDMA), and random 
access protocols (Xiao, 2004). We also assume that packet loss and the overall quality of 
service have no effect on the formulation (Xiao, 2004). In reality, those are primary 
concerns for military commanders.  
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We also assume that the attacker and defender (network operator) have perfect 
information about the network. This is the underlying assumption behind the SRRA-
Attack formulation in this thesis. Each party knows every detail including the capabilities 
and ranges of every node and jammer, the noise associated with every receiver, and the 
existence and location of every link in the network. This is, of course, unrealistic for a 
practical setting. We can compare scenarios where the attacker makes assumptions about 
the network topology in comparison to where he has perfect information. We can use 
these comparisons to deem the value of information and how it can affect the attacker’s 
choices. 
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